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Speculation about the possibility of China and Russia creating an official strategic alliance in 
response to American unipolar dominance is not new and can be traced back to the early 
1990s. Recently, however, the American “pivot to Asia,” China’s new assertiveness in 
territorial disputes, Russia’s high-profile “turn to the East,” and the deterioration of Russia-
America and, more broadly, Russia-West relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis 
have generated a complex geopolitical milieu that reignited discussion among both policy 
advocates and scholars about the prospects of a China-Russia strategic alliance. 
 
 For example, Alexei Pushkov (the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee in Russia’s 
lower house) stated that “the United States runs the risk of making a huge foreign policy 
blunder by simultaneously antagonizing two major world powers…. For the United States, 
Russia is an enemy and China is a potential enemy. But the confrontation course with both 
major powers is a strategic mistake.”1 Some Russian analysts also argued that “America 
cannot stop containing China. America cannot stop containing Russia. American cannot stop 
pushing China and Russia to a new political and military alignment.”2 In China, where until 
recently the official line was “non-alignment” (bu jiemeng zhengce), some prominent 
scholars have started to make unambiguous calls for a comprehensive strategic alliance with 
Russia by arguing on the pages of the CCP Central Party School’s internal publications that 
“China-Russia strategic relations are the most substantive ones”3 and elsewhere that “China 
will be unable to shift the world from unipolarity to bipolarity unless it forms a formal 
alliance with Russia.”4 Most recently, John Mearsheimer on multiple occasions castigated 
American policy towards Russia by calling it “strategic foolishness of the first order” because 
it drives Russia and China together, which is against American interests.5  
 
 The recently reinvigorated discussion of the prospects of a new China-Russia alliance 
is accompanied by the reemergence of age-old myths about China-Russia relations. These 
myths are cliché views of Russia, China, and the relations between them that have become 
the default rhetorical background of many evaluations of the chances for a China-Russia 
alliance to materialize (the actual sources of these views can be a topic for a different paper). 
In this article, I use empirical evidence to debunk four such popular myths that are often 
brought up as reflecting the obstacles of a potential alliance between the two countries.  
 
The first myth runs as follows: because post-Soviet Russia is much weaker than China, 
any alliance between the two will be disproportional and will look like a “union of unequals.” 
This is not in Russia’s interest, and therefore, Russia is reluctant to enter any alliance with 
China. The second myth addresses demography and revives the “yellow peril” bogeyman, 
mostly forgotten in Russia. According to this story, if Russia and China become too close to 
each other, Russia’s underpopulated regions in the Far East and Siberia are going to be 
quietly occupied by the Chinese, whose country is already overpopulated. Russia obviously 
does not want this and, therefore, will not form an alliance with China. The third myth is 
about Russia’s excessive economic dependence on China at the expense of Russia’s relations 
with other Asian countries. Excessive closeness to China will turn Russia into an energy 
appendage of China and, in a worst case scenario, can generate strong centrifugal pressures 
within Russia and even result in the loss of control by Russia over its underdeveloped eastern 
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territories. Therefore, Russia is highly unlikely to form an alliance with China. The fourth 
myth is that there is no trust between China and Russia. Because they do not trust each other, 
alliance is unlikely.  
 
All four myths emerge in different forms and shades and all try to reveal the obstacles 
to a future alliance. Some of them are very convincing at first sight because they seem to be 
based on some geographic, economic, social, and demographic circumstances of the region 
surrounding China-Russia common border. At a closer examination, however, one can see 
that all four myths lack solid empirical grounds.  
 
Myth One: Russia’s Declining Power and Non-alignment with China. 
Russia is consistently pictured as a weak or weakening power. Joseph Nye, for example, 
wrote in his recent commentary on the possibilities of a China-Russia alliance that Russia 
may not be able to manage a real alliance with China and that one of the reasons for this is 
that “Russia’s economic and military power has been in decline, whereas China’s has 
exploded.”6 He further argues that Russia is anxious “over China’s conventional military 
superiority” and that the power imbalance between China and Russia suggests that Russia 
would resist a tight military alliance with China.7  
 
These statements can be rejected upfront because relative weakness/strength is not a 
decisive factor in alliance formation. Most military alliances are asymmetrical in terms of the 
relative power of their members. All American allies are disproportionally weaker than the 
U.S. but nevertheless are very useful for American global supremacy, and moreover, the 
allies are unwilling to withdraw from their alliance with the U.S. However, how has Russia’s 
power vis-à-vis China been changing over the last decade or so? Is Russia, indeed, in a state 
of hopeless decline? 
 
A cursory glance at the empirical data demonstrates that the above-cited statement 
that Russia’s economic and military power “has been in decline” is wrong. Post-Soviet 
Russia has been making significant progress both economically and militarily. In this sense, 
the world, for some reason, is very selective in terms of picking up examples of rising powers. 
Figure 1 displays the change of GDP and military expenditures of post-Soviet Russia. Aside 
from 8 years of decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been growing 
remarkably and consistently over the last 14 years. In 1999, Russia’s GDP fell to a meager 
$US 196 billion; by 2013 its GDP reached $US 2.1 trillion, which is an 11-fold increase. 
Russia’s military spending in 2013 was $US 88 billion, which is 14 times larger than $US 
6.47 billion—what it was in 1999.  
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Figure 1: Economic and Military Growth in Post-Soviet Russia 
 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries 
             SIPRI Military Expenditure Database http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
 
Russia is also not a declining power in comparative terms. Figure 2 shows military 
spending of BRIC member states since 1991. Russia was below both India and Brazil in the 
late 1990s but leaped forward after the turn of the century. According to an SIPRI report, in 
2014 Russia’s military budget was approximately 2.5 trillion rubles, which ranks Russia third 
in the world after the U.S. and China. Since 2008, Russia’s military budget has grown by 31 
percent, and Russia had surpassed the UK and Saudi Arabia. Over the last 16 years, Russia’s 
military budget has increased almost 14-fold. In relative terms, in 1999, China’s military 
budget was 3.2 times larger than Russia’s ($US 20.56 billion and $US 6.47 billion, 
respectively), but by 2013, this ratio dropped to 2.2, with China’s and Russia’s military 
budgets amounting to $US 188. 46 and $US 86.84 billion, respectively. Therefore, it cannot 
be argued, either in absolute or relative terms, that Russia’s power has been in decline. If 
relative power matters at all for alliance formation, a China-Russia alliance now is much 
more feasible than it was 10 or 15 years ago because, contrary to the theories of Russia’s 














































Figure 2: Military Spending of BRIC members ($US billion) 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
 
Another crucial aspect of China-Russia relations is the fact that Russia is a major 
exporter of high-tech weaponry. The importance of this must not be underestimated. The lack 
of advanced military technology is the Achilles Heel of China’s superpower standing and a 
source of frustration for the Chinese government. Although China’s arms export is growing, 
it still lacks state-of-the-art military technologies, and Russian weapons remain a “holy grail” 
for China. Russia’s qualitative comparative advantage in military technology vis-à-vis China 
substantially elevates Russia’s position in bilateral relations and reduces China’s quantitative 
advantage, which is not necessarily directly convertible into power capabilities. 
 
The final point that should be kept in mind is the quantity and quality of Russia’s 
nuclear weapons, which are on par and in some aspects even better than those of the U.S. The 
story of global-range nuclear capabilities is still the story of two countries: Russia and the 
U.S. Moreover, Russia is still the only power that has guaranteed second-strike capability 
against the U.S. In this regard, those IR theorists who argue that in the post-Cold War world 
America is powerful to the extent that there is no existential threat to it are plain wrong. The 
Soviet nuclear capacity effectively contained the U.S. during the Cold War. Russia’s current 
and considerably modernized nuclear weapons continue to contain the U.S. Russian and 
American nuclear stockpiles are still the guarantor of the rule according to which American 
soldiers never shoot Russian soldiers, and vice versa, in a direct military conflict. Having 
nuclear capability sufficient for containing the U.S., Russia will feel very comfortable in the 
arms of the Chinese, whose nuclear capabilities lag far behind both the U.S. and Russia.    
 
Myth Two: Demographic Factor as a Barrier for China-Russia Alliance. 
Another alleged concern about China-Russia relations that may undermine the potential for 
alliance lies in demographic conditions. The issue of China being overpopulated and Russia, 
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publications. Some talk about a “vast population of potential migrants” that may come from 
China.8 Others draw scary pictures of the disappearance of Russia’s ethnic identity, threats to 
Russia’s territorial integrity, and “creeping Sinicization” that may happen because there are 
too many Chinese and too few Russians along the China-Russia border.9 According to Nye, 
one of the deep problems hindering the formation of a China-Russia alliance is that in Eastern 
Siberia, six million Russians live across the border from up to 120 million Chinese.10 Others 
write that Russia is reluctant to form an alliance with China because it is “demographically in 
decline” and there are concerns about the uncontrolled migration of Chinese citizens into the 
sparsely populated areas of Russia’s Far East and Siberia that may eventually be taken over 
by China.11 
 
Under closer examination, the statement that demography is what Russia should 
worry about when forming an alliance with China crumbles. First, Russia’s demographic 
decline is not the case any longer, and the depopulation trend had been reversed by the end of 
the first decade of the 21st century. In 2009, Russia recorded population growth and added 
23,300 people. 12  In 2012, Russia’s population increased by 292,400 people. 13  In 2013, 
Russia’s total fertility rate reached 1.707 children per woman and became the highest in 
Eastern, Southern and Central Europe. 14  By 2013, the trend of depopulation had been 
reversed, and natural population growth started. 15  Figure 1 reflects Russia’s long term 
demographic trend, which refutes the statement that Russia is in decline demographically. 
 
Figure 1: Population Dynamics in Russia 
 
Source: Calculated based on data from ROSSTAT http://www.gks.ru/  
 
Second, regarding the demographic gap between the border regions of Russia and 
China, the situation may not be as troubling as is pictured and there are no reasons to expect 
Chinese immigration to Russia’s Far East. Table 3 compares population density in border 
provinces of China (first column) with that in corresponding bordering provinces/regions of 
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Chinese province by population density of a corresponding bordering Russian and Mongolian 
province. As seen from the table, the average population density of Russia’s Krai and Oblast 
bordering China is 17.83 times lower than that of Chinese provinces bordering Russia. In the 
case of Mongolia, which also shares a long border with China, this figure is 32.9. In other 
words, the population gap between bordering Mongolian and Chinese provinces is much 
larger than that between Russian and Chinese provinces. China so far has not displayed even 
a slight desire to occupy Mongolian provinces that are much more underpopulated than the 
Russian ones. If China does not occupy the bordering territories of Mongolia (a state that can 
barely defend itself), what would make China start occupying territories of a nuclear 
superpower? Moreover, as the last segment of Table 3 demonstrates, China has its own 
Siberia—Tibet and Qinghai—with population densities 60 and 20 times lower than in the 
Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces, which border Russia. Therefore, the natural population 
imbalance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for migration.  
 
Table 3: Comparative population density of border regions (people/km2) 
Population density in bordering regions of China and Russia Pop. Density Ratio 
Heilongjiang                             (86.4) 
Khabarovsk Krai                      (1.70) 50.82 
Amurskaya Oblast                   (2.24) 38.57 
Primorsky Krai                        (11.74) 7.36 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast     (4.64) 18.62 
Jilin                                            (149) Primorsky Krai                        (11.74) 12.69 
Inner Mongolia                          (21.4) Zabaykalsky Krai                     (2.52) 20.4 
Average of border provinces    (85.6) Average of border regions  (4.57) 18.73 
China average                           (145) Russia average     (9) 16.11 
Pop. Dens. in bordering regions of China and Mongolia Pop. Density Ratio 
Gansu                                        (56.3) Govi-Altai Province                 (0.38) 148.1 
Inner Mongolia                         (21.4) 
Dornod Province                      (0.56) 38.21 
Sükhbaatar Province                (0.66) 32.42 
Xinjiang                                    (13.1) 
Khovd Province                        (1.0) 13.1 
Bayan-Olgiy Province              (2.0) 6.55 
Average of border provinces   (30.27) Average of border provinces    (0.92) 32.90 
China average                          (145) Mongolia average                    (1.76) 82.39 
Jilin, Heilongjiang and least-densely populated China’s provinces Pop. Density Ratio 
 
 
Jilin                                            (149) 
Tibet                                            (2.5) 59.6 
Qinghai                                        (7.8) 19.1 
Xinjiang                                       (13.1) 11.37 
Inner Mongolia                            (21.4) 6.96 
Heilongjiang                              (86.4) 
Tibet                                             (2.5) 34.56 
Qinghai                                         (7.8) 11.07 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST for country data. Provincial level data 
were collected from various sources, including statistical reports by local governments. 
 
Another important fact in contradiction with the assumption that China is going to be 
demographically expansionist is the demographic trends within China. China has long since 
entered a phase of extremely low birth rates. In the early 1990s, the total fertility rate in 
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China crossed the 2.14 mark, which is the natural replacement rate.16 By the late 1990s, the 
TFR in China reached 1.8, and by 2011 it dropped to 1.5, which is significantly below that in 
a number of advanced economics, such as the US, the UK and France.17  According to 
China’s sixth population census, in large cities, the country’s TFR dropped to 0.88, which is 
one of the lowest in the world. Interestingly, according to some research, the record low of 
0.14 for the entire TFR history was registered in 2000 in the urban district of Jiamusi in 
Heilongjiang province, which makes this bordering-on-Russia Chinese province the absolute 
record-holder.18 These population dynamics within China are the cause of the rapid aging of 
population. As a result, China will need its working population at home in the years to come. 
 
Most importantly, recent research on the patterns of migration between China and 
Russia reveals that the Chinese do not come to Russia and its Far East in large numbers. Most 
of those who actually go to Russia return home once their visas or work permits expire. This 
was the case during early 2000s, when the population of Russia was in decline and China was 
poorer than now, and it is even more so now, when the trend of depopulation in Russia has 
been reversed and living standards in China have further improved. The problem of the 
migration dimension in the “Chinese threat” to Russia was successfully dismissed by V.Ya. 
Portyakov in a series of articles on Chinese migration to Russia.19 The issue of Chinese 
emigration to Russia has been overblown by irresponsible media and Russian local politicians 
who have tried to build political capital by creating an image that they are fending off the 
Chinese threat. The real essence of the phenomenon of the Chinese migration to Russia was 
very precisely expressed by a Russian journalist who wrote, “Russia is not a lusted-after land 
for the Chinese eager to settle there, while trips to Russia are simply a compulsory economic 
necessity.”20 Protyakov demonstrates that Russia is not a priority destination for the Chinese 
emigrants. Responsible voices of the representatives of the academic community in Russia, 
who do not make “threats” out of nothing, are now gaining increasing force. It has become a 
consensus that Chinese immigration has no significant impact on the demographic situation 
of the Russia’s Far East and, when properly managed, can be in Russia’s geopolitical 
interests. The myths and imposed stereotypes about Chinese migration to Russia are 
dissipating and an adequate understanding of its nature as temporary migration is emerging.21 
 
Myth Three: Russia’s Excessive Dependence on China. 
The third myth is a continuation of an old story about Russia, particularly its Far Eastern 
regions, becoming excessively dependent on China and, even worse, turning into an energy 
appendage of China. Mankoff wrote that “Russia’s ambitions to become a significant player 
are at odds with its growing dependence on China.”22 Rozman believes that “The door is 
closing on a strategy to maximize Russia’s leverage in the Asia-Pacific region and to develop 
the Russian Far East as anything but a resource appendage for China.”23 Russia’s Asian pivot, 
therefore, amounts to Russia’s pivot to China, not to a broader Asia. This may be a problem 
for a China-Russia alliance because “there is the worry that in exporting little more than raw 
materials to China, Russia is increasingly tying itself into a semi-colonial relationship.”24 
This myth emerges every time China-Russia relations develop and the two countries enter a 
new stage of cooperation. 
9 
 The reality is that the largest stable trade partner of Russia is still the EU. Almost 50% 
of Russia’s external trade is with the EU, whereas China occupies slightly more than 10% in 
Russia’s total external trade. It is also not a secret that natural resources so far remain the 
lion’s share of Russia’s export to the EU. Thus, if Russia is an “energy appendage” of anyone, 
it is of Europe, not China. If Russia has been able to manage such asymmetrical trade 
relations with Europe for decades (even through troubled Ukraine), why is it assumed that a 
similar pattern of relations with China is going to be a problem?       
 
 The most revealing evidence is the comparisons of the relative weights of China, 
Japan, and South Korea in the external trade of Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District 
(RFEFD)—the one that, as some predict, is particularly vulnerable to becoming a resource 
colony of China. As Table 4 clearly demonstrates, the external trade of RFEFD is actually 
more dependent on South Korea than China. Relative to China, the overall trade with Korea 
has been larger most of the time. As to exports from RFEFD to China, it is much smaller than 
exports to either Japan or Korea, and its share has not grown over the last 8 years. This 
completely debunks the myth that the region is turning into an energy appendage of China. If 
it is an energy appendage at all, it is that of South Korea and Japan, but not China.  
 
Table 4: Share of China, Japan and South Korea in external trade of RFEFD (%) 
Year-
country 
Share of China Share of Japan Share of South Korea 
export import overall export import overall export import overall 
2006 37.9 22.4 30.8 22.1 25.6 23.4 12.3 23.1 18.0 
2007 16.4 33.0 23.3 36.9 26.5 32.5 38.3 16.9 29.3 
2008 13.5 36.5 23.1 34.2 31.0 32.8 42.1 8.1 28.0 
2009 22.1 43.5 28.7 33.4 10.1 26.2 35.0 8.3 26.7 
2010 16.6 51.5 26.6 31.1 10.1 26.4 28.8 11.6 23.8 
2011 16.8 46.7 24.9 27.7 9.9 22.9 33.8 14.4 28.6 
2012 20.0 45.5 27.2 28.9 9.3 23.2 32.4 17.9 28.2 
2013 19.4 46.8 27.7 32.7 14.2 27.0 30.1 12.1 24.7 
2014 19.0 45.0 26.0 29.7 19.6 26.3 32.0 10.6 26.2 
Source: Far Eastern Branch of Federal Custom Service of Russia http://dvtu.customs.ru/index.php  
  
As to the recent $400 billion gas megadeal, its impact on China-Russia relations, 
especially in terms of who becomes dependent on whom, is not clear-cut because it ties China 
to Russia the same way that it ties Russia to China. It is a strategic shift for China as well. It 
is an indication not only of how seriously Russia is taking steps towards China but also of 
how seriously China is taking steps towards Russia. To realize gas delivery from Russia to 
China, the two countries have committed themselves to developing a powerful pipeline 
network also worthy of hundreds billions of dollars. Once put in place, pipelines are 
immovable and both sides become committed to using them and fulfilling a range of mutual 
obligations. Such long-term infrastructure commitments are not taken lightly by the 
governments on both sides and demonstrate certainty about the partner and the willingness to 
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compromise, which is going to underpin China-Russia relations. From this standpoint, the gas 
deal is not just a step by Russia towards China, but rather a step by both towards each other. 
 
Arms trade between China and Russia is where China becomes dependent on Russia 
and not the other way around. China is not the main market for Russian weapons, but for 
China, Russia is the main source of advanced military hardware. Table 5 shows trends in 
international arms transfer. The share of Russian weapons accounts for more than 60 percent 
of China’s total import of military hardware, whereas the role of the Chinese market for 
Russian arms exports is only 11%. In case Russia decides to cut its exports to China, it will 
lose only 11% of sales, whereas China will lose 61% of all of its purchases. If one is to talk 
about the dependence of Russia on external markets, it seems that the Indian market is more 
important because it occupies almost 40 percent in Russia’s total exports.  
 
Table 5: Arms exports from Russia to China and India (%) 
Indicator-year 2005-2009 2006-2010 2007-2011 2008-2012 2009-2013 2010-2014 
Share of China in 
Russia’s total export 35 23 16 15 12 11 
Share of Russia in 
China’s total import 89 84 78 69 64 61 
Share of India in 
Russia’s total export 24 33 33 35 38 39 
Source: SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfer http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers  
 
 Contrary to many statements, the excessive dependence of Russia, and particularly 
Russia’s Far Eastern territories, on China is not in accord with reality. Therefore, should the 
two countries decide to form an official alliance, the overdependence of former on the latter 
should not be an issue. 
 
Myth Four: There is not Enough Trust between China and Russia 
The fourth myth is about the lack of “trust” in China-Russia relations. The role of what is 
meant by the vague concept of “trust” is being played up by many who comment on China-
Russia relations in general and the chances of a China-Russia alliance materializing in 
particular. Some talk about the “transactional nature of the Sino-Russian relationship” and 
argue that “Sino-Russian relations lack trust and are characterized by competition, especially 
in the two countries’ shared region”25 Others argue that “in spite of a series of common 
interests on the global scene, there is a fundamental lack of strategic trust between the two 
[China and Russia].”26 Still, others go so far as to argue that “Russia neither trusts anyone, 
nor is, in turn, trusted by anyone, in Asia.”27 
 
 However, the reality is that states’ policies are shaped, first and foremost, by national 
interests and not trust. “Trust” between states in the international politics is unlikely. At the 
core of any alliance is a transaction based on common interests, and the degree of overlap in 
these interests predefines whether there is any “trust.” An alliance between two countries is 
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not a marriage between two people, a relationship where trust plays crucial role. Trust never 
plays a decisive role in shaping the foreign policies of states. Similarly to Russia, the U.S. 
and China also do not trust anyone and are not trusted by others. Alliances emerge and 
disappear according to international circumstances. China was ally of the Soviet Union in the 
1950s. By the 1970s, however, there was an alignment between China and the U.S. In the 
1980s, China announced a non-alignment strategy, whereas Russia has always had allies. The 
U.S. was the major anti-Communist country during the Cold War. However, as some scholars 
perspicaciously note, how does one explain the fact that Nixon, who was a major opponent of 
Communism, courted Mao’s China and abandoned Taiwan, which was America’s loyal anti-
Communist ally? Why did Carter, a human rights crusader, turn a blind eye to China’s human 
rights violations and elevate U.S.-China relations? Why did Reagan, a militant anti-
Communist, restore U.S.-China military cooperation? What made Clinton rush to delink 
China’s Most Favored Nation status from its human rights performance?28 Were these sudden 
outbursts of American trust toward China? 
 
 When conditions for a balancing coalition are ripe, states do not have the luxury of 
following their subjective preferences and basing their relations on the things called “trust.” 
China-Russia relations have had ups and downs during their long history, but there is nothing 
abnormal in terms of trust and mistrust between the two countries. Like many other states, 
China and Russia do not have to trust each other to form an alliance that will serve certain 
purposes and then be dismissed once the international situation changes.  
 
 Even if we buy an assumption that trust matters in alliance formation, there are no 
reasons to see trust as a problem in China-Russia relations. China and Russia started to 
interact with each other on the ground well before the United States emerged on the world 
map, and there is a certain geopolitical sense of a big neighbor in both Russia and China. 
Recently, as some rightly noted, Putin and Xi seem to be friends and the level of trust 
between them is higher than it regularly is between two countries. According to Gabuev, 
“Putin has more trust in Xi than in any Chinese leader before him and any current Western 
leader,” and that the “sincerity Putin feels in Xi has helped the Kremlin to adjust many 
policies towards China that had been in place for over a decade.”29 In centralized political 
systems like China and Russia, personal trust between top decision makers may have a 
greater impact on foreign policy than in decentralized systems. At the same time, as recent 
public opinion surveys in Russia demonstrate, the way the Russians view the Chinese has 
improved dramatically. More than 60% of ordinary Russians consider Russia-China relations 
to be friendly.30 Moreover, a positive turn in Russians’ views of China occurred long before 
the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West. Thus, 
various public opinion research centers register positive perceptional dynamics in Russia-
China relations at least since 2006.31 This reconfirms the disappearance of the “China threat” 
complex in the Russian society. Today, the majority of the Russian public considers China a 
friendly state and believes that a stronger China is not a threat to Russia. It is reasonable to 




The main goal of the analysis presented here is not to prove that China and Russia will soon 
enter and inevitably develop alliance relations. This will depend on many factors, one of 
which is American policies towards both China and Russia. As the American policy makers’ 
recognition of the ongoing China-Russia rapprochement grows, the U.S. may start trying hard 
to put a wedge between China and Russia, and it is hard to predict the results of such policies. 
Instead, the goal of the analysis was to dissipate the preset views and biases regarding China-
Russia relations that, according to many observers, may become a barrier for a China-Russia 
alliance to emerge. As demonstrated above, none of the four myths fully conform to reality. 
They are elements of a constructed counter-productive “matrix” prevailing in the thinking 
about China-Russia relations. 
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